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Abstract  
We use matched employer-employee data from Finland to model transitions out 
of work into sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of 
institutional factors we exploit reforms that changed medical requirements for 
disability pension eligibility and experience-rated employer contributions. We 
find that transitions to sick leave and disability pension benefits are relatively 
rare in growing establishments, but rather common in establishments with a high 
degree of excess worker turnover. We also show that transitions to disability 
retirement depend on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of 
experience rating applied to the employer. 
Key words: Disability pension, sick leave, experience rating 
JEL classification numbers: J14, J23, J26  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Mallinnamme tässä tutkimuksessa yksityisen sektorin ikääntyneiden työnteki-
jöiden siirtymistä pitkille sairaslomille ja työkyvyttömyyseläkkeelle. Pyrimme 
tarkastelemaan yritysten taloudellisten kannustimien ja toisaalta työntekijöiden 
eläkesääntöjen vaikutusta sairaslomien ja työkyvyttömyyseläkkeiden kohtaan-
toon käyttämällä hyväksi eläkesäännöissä tapahtuneita muutoksia (yksilöllisen 
varhaiseläkkeen ikärajan nostot ja lopulta koko eläkelajin poistaminen) sekä yri-
tysten työkyvyttömyyseläkkeiden omavastuiden muutoksia. Tulostemme perus-
teella eläke-ehtojen kiristämisellä oli selkeä vähentävä vaikutus myönnettyihin 
työkyvyttömyyseläkkeisiin ja yritysten omavastuut ohjaavat selvästi työkyvyt-
tömyyseläkkeen käyttöä yritysten henkilöstöstrategiassa. Tämän lisäksi havait-
simme yrityksen kasvun pienentävän työkyvyttömyysriskiä ja henkilöiden 
ylimääräisen vaihtuvuuden kasvattavan sitä. 
 
Asiasanat: työkyvyttömyyseläke, sairasloma, yritysten omavastuu 
JEL-luokittelu: J14, J23, J26 
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1. Introduction 
The disability benefit scheme is one of the largest social security programmes in 
many countries and therefore of particular interest. In Finland, disability is the 
most common reason for early retirement, and disability expenditure accounted 
for some 3.5% of GDP in 2003, which was the third highest share in the EU after 
Sweden and Denmark (Börsch-Supan, 2007). Disability enrolment rates of older 
employees vary strikingly across the European countries and the US. These 
cross-country differences cannot be explained by demographic or health-related 
factors, but are attributable to institutional differences in the disability schemes 
(Börsch-Supan, 2007). During the past two or three decades, many countries 
have also experienced an expansion of disability benefit enrolment. This is a 
serious concern given the common goal to induce people to retire later. The 
widespread use of disability benefits as an early retirement instrument has been 
argued to be a particularly serious problem in Finland (e.g. OECD, 2008). 
Disability benefits are designed to provide insurance for employees' labour 
income against the risk of becoming disabled and incapable of regular work. In 
practice, it may be difficult to identify employees who are truly disabled, which 
suggests the possibility that disability benefits can distort labour supply and 
demand in some cases. Autor and Duggan (2003, 2006), for example, argue that 
rapid growth in disability benefit rolls in the US cannot be explained by changes 
in health, but is driven by a combination of labour demand conditions and 
changes in the disability scheme itself (in terms of generosity, coverage, and 
screening intensity). Other authors have also found evidence of the importance of 
the generosity of disability benefits, the stringency of medical screening, and the 
economic environment when explaining participation in disability programmes 
(e.g. Gruber, 2000, Black et al., 2002, and Campolieti, 2004). A majority of this 
literature has been motivated by a simple labour supply framework, in which an 
employee chooses whether to apply for disability benefits, while the employer 
has no role at all. Surprisingly little effort has been made to study the labour 
demand side (some exceptions are Hassink et al., 1997, and Koning, 2009). 
When employment reductions are necessary, firms often get rid of their oldest 
employees first. If health requirements for disability benefit eligibility are weak, 
early retirement via the disability scheme can be a useful strategy in effective 
downsizing, providing a way to reduce the workforce in a "soft" way. On the 
other hand, some firms can also target dismissals at those employees with a high 
risk of disability. In doing so, the employer may avoid disability costs arising 
from the experienced-rated contributions of disability pension benefits. 
Encouraging disability retirement can be an attractive strategy also for an 
employer that wants to change the composition of the workforce at the time of 
stable or growing employment when dismissals are difficult to justify. 
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This study aims to shed some light on the relationships between labour demand, 
institutional factors and early retirement through disability programmes. We 
consider the importance of the labour demand side by examining the relationship 
between the establishment's growth and restructuring rates and its employees' 
disability entries. In addition, we assess the effectiveness of two policy 
instruments: the strictness of medical requirements for disability pension 
eligibility and the experience rating of disability expenditures. The first one 
determines the ease of access to disability pension benefits, whereas the latter 
one directs part of the costs of early retirement to the employer. 
Using matched employer-employee data from Finland, we model transitions out 
of work to sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of 
institutional factors we exploit a law change that made the medical requirements 
for disability pension eligibility tougher for a certain group, as well as changes in 
partially experience-rated employer contributions. We show that transitions to 
sick leave and disability pension benefits are relatively rare in growing 
establishments, but rather common in establishments with a high degree of 
excess worker turnover. We find no evidence that employers would actively 
encourage disability retirement as a way of adjusting their workforce when 
downsizing. Finally, we show that the transition rate to disability retirement 
depends on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of experience 
rating applied to the employer. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a short overview of 
the existing literature. Section 3 describes the Finnish social security system for 
sickness benefits and disability pensions. We discuss our data and report 
descriptive statistics in section 4. The results of our econometric analyses are 
reported and discussed in section 5, which is followed by a concluding section. 
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2. Related literature 
Disability benefits are typically determined as a function of past earnings, which 
are likely to be correlated with the employee's preferences for work. The 
resulting endogeneity problem has hampered attempts to quantify the impact of 
disability benefits on labour supply. Gruber (2000) and Campolieti (2004) 
overcome the endogeneity problem by exploiting policy changes in the Canadian 
disability benefit scheme that had differential effects on people living in different 
parts of the country. While Gruber estimates that the elasticity of 
nonparticipation with respect to disability insurance benefits is between 0.28–
0.36, Campolieti finds no statistically significant relationship. In the late 1980s, 
which is the period analysed by Gruber, nonmedical factors related to the 
availability of suitable jobs in the region and personal skills were taken into 
consideration when determining benefit eligibility. Campolieti considers an 
earlier reform that took place in the early 1970s when the eligibility requirements 
and the stringency of medical screening were tougher. This led Campolieti to 
argue that the generosity of the disability benefits may not distort working 
decisions when it is difficult to qualify for such benefits because of a strict 
screening process. 
Using aggregate data for the US, Black et al. (2002) and Autor and Duggan 
(2003, 2006) find evidence of the relationship between disability participation 
and business cycle conditions. Black et al. use data from the coal boom and bust 
in the 1970s and 1980s, which affected only a few coal-producing counties, to 
construct instrumental variables for local labour market shocks. According to 
their county-level analysis, participation in disability programmes falls during 
economic upturns, and this relationship is much stronger for permanent than for 
transitory economic shocks. Autor and Duggan discuss a dramatic expansion of 
disability insurance enrolment during the past two decades in the US.1 They 
argue that this growth cannot be explained by a true increase in the incidence of 
disabling illness. Instead, they claim that the reduced stringency of the screening 
for disability benefits after 1984, an increase in the earnings replacement rate, 
and an increase in female labour force participation have played important roles. 
As a result of the liberalization of disability benefits in 1984, the disability 
application rates were found to become more responsive to adverse labour 
demand shocks. This result supports Campolieti's (2004) interpretation of 
Canadian evidence. Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate that the unemployment 
rate of workers aged 25–64 in 1998 was a half percentage point lower than it 
would have been otherwise. They argue that the US disability system has begun 
to "function much like a long-term unemployment insurance program for the 
unemployable" (Autor and Duggan 2006, p. 74). 
                                              
1 See McVicar (2008) for discussion about the growth in disability benefit rolls in the UK. 
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Unlike the US studies based on aggregate data, Vahtera et al. (2005) and Rege et 
al. (2009) analyse individual-specific disability risks. Using matched employer-
employee data for Norway, Rege et al. explain the likelihood of being on a 
disability pension with dummy variables indicating various degrees of plant 
downsizing during the past six years. They find a substantial increase in the 
transition rate to disability retirement following plant downsizing or plant 
closure.2 Whereas Rege et al. do not make a distinction between those who kept 
their jobs and those who lost their jobs in plant downsizing, Vahtera et al. 
consider a risk of disability retirement among Finnish municipal employees who 
kept their jobs after the reduction of personnel in their organisation. These 
employment reductions were carried out between 1991 and 1993, during a period 
of severe recession in Finland. They find an almost twofold risk of being granted 
a permanent disability pension in the next five years after a major downsizing 
(more than 18% reduction in the personnel) than after no downsizing (less than 
8% reduction). Thus, not only employees who lose their jobs, but also those who 
keep their jobs after the employment reduction are subject to an increased 
disability risk. 
Börsch-Supan (2007) points out that disability expenditures and enrolment rates 
vary notably across different countries. In Europe disability expenditures are 
highest in Finland, Sweden and Denmark.3 Börsch-Supan analyses the cross-
country differences in the disability enrolment rates of people aged 50 to 65 
years, using harmonized survey data for 12 European countries and similar 
survey data for the UK and US. He finds very little explanatory power for 
demographic and health-related differences across the countries. By contrast, 
three quarters of the cross-country variation was explained by the institutional 
variables that describe the generosity and the ease of access of the disability 
insurance. The most influential institutional factor turned out to be the strictness 
by which vocational considerations are applied when determining eligibility. 
The studies discussed above do not pay much attention to the employer's role. 
Hutchens (1999) develops a theoretical framework that helps to understand why 
employers may be actively involved in early retirement decisions. He introduces 
an implicit contract model of a firm that uses early retirement benefits, provided 
by the government, as a form of unemployment insurance. Within this 
framework, the public early retirement benefits effectively subsidize workforce 
reductions. Therefore, the firm responds to slack demand by encouraging early 
retirement, which leads to an inefficiently high level of early retirement. 
                                              
2 They also find an increase in mortality rates among workers whose plants downsized. 
3 Disability schemes represent only a part of the social security system. How people who are unable, or 
unwilling, to work are allocated between sickness, unemployment, disability, and early retirement 
schemes depends on relative compensation levels and eligibility criteria, which vary from country to 
country. Hence, a low disability enrolment rate may be associated with a high rate of sickness absence, 
long-term unemployment or voluntary early retirement. These kinds of spillovers should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results from cross-country comparisons. 
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Hutchens also discusses two alternative policies: actuarial adjustments and 
experience rating. An actuarial adjustment places costs on early retirees by 
reducing their future benefits compared to the case where retirement occurs at a 
later day, whereas experience rating places costs on firms by directing part of the 
early retirement expenditure to the former employer. While both of these policies 
can be used to reduce the implicit subsidy, and thereby restore early retirement to 
the efficient level, their implementation is subject to some practical drawbacks. 
Namely, an effective early retirement scheme should vary with individual 
characteristics, like wages and survival probabilities. Since the real-world 
scheme cannot account for all individual heterogeneity, the implicit subsidy will 
exist at least for some groups even if the scheme eliminates the subsidy "on 
average". 
Theoretical insights of Hutchens (1999) are supported by empirical findings of 
two studies from the Netherlands. Using data on the dismissal and disability rates 
of Dutch firms, Hassink et al. (1997) examine to what extent separations into 
disability are used as an alternative to dismissals. They estimate that about one-
tenth of the observed inflow into disability were effectively dismissals. The data 
used by Hassink et al. covered the years 1988 and 1990 when the experience 
rating of disability benefits was not yet introduced in the Netherlands. In 1998 
the employer's annual disability insurance contribution rate was tied to the 
amount of disability benefits received by its former employees during a past 5-
year period (beginning 7 and ending 2 years prior to the year in question). As a 
result, the employers became partly liable for the costs of the first five years of 
disability benefits. Koning (2009) compares inflow rates to disability benefits 
between employers that experienced a change in the contribution rate in 2001 
(triggered by a decline or increase in the disability inflow in 1999 compared with 
an earlier period) and those with no change in the contribution rate. He finds that 
in the firms that experienced a (positive or negative) change in the contribution 
rate the disability inflow rate decreased during the next two years compared with 
the firms with no change in the contribution rate. Koning interprets this as 
evidence that employers were not completely aware of the experience rating 
scheme, and hence the change in the contribution rate acted as a "wake-up call" 
to pay attention to experience rating. This in turn induced the employers to 
increase preventive actions, reducing disability events in the subsequent years. 
It is should be stressed that Koning's data only covered three post-reform years, 
and thereby there were no exogenous changes in the experience rating scheme 
during the observation period. Instead, all the observed changes in the 
contribution rates were driven by changes in firms' own disability history. While 
Koning's findings indicate some information imperfections (at least a few years 
after the introduction of the experience rating system) and imply that experience 
rating does matter, his results do not describe the causal effects of having a given 
degree, or a particular type, of an experience rating system compared with the 
counterfactual case of having some another scheme. 
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In sum, we can draw the following lessons from the existing literature: 1) the 
generosity of disability compensation and negative demand shocks increase the 
entry rates to disability benefit schemes, 2) the strength of this relationship 
depends on the stringency of medical screening, and 3) the experience rating of 
disability benefit costs can be used to reduce the moral hazard problem. Our 
study complements this literature in a number of ways. First, in addition to 
studying transitions from work to disability retirement, we also consider 
transitions from work to sick leave and from sick leave to disability retirement. 
In this way, we can differentiate between factors affecting the incidence of 
sickness or injury (ex ante effects) and those affecting the intensity or success of 
medical and occupational rehabilitation (ex post effects). This distinction helps us 
to detect the point in the disability pension track when certain policy instruments 
are effective. Second, when analysing the role of labour demand, we pay 
particular attention to excess worker turnover, which describes a degree of 
restructuring for a given employment change. This helps us to show that 
disability benefits may be used to adjust the structure of the workforce at the 
times when the employment level is stable. Third, we take advantage of two 
policy reforms to identify the causal effects of the experience rating of disability 
benefits. Our results indicate that experience rating reduces the incidence of 
disability and sickness. Finally, by accounting for a firm's financial position, we 
also show that experience rating has a heterogeneous effect, being less effective 
for those employers that can easily incur their share of the disability pension 
costs. 
Given that there is hardly any evidence on the experience rating of disability 
benefits, our analysis of the effects of experience-rated contributions on the 
disability entry rate is the main contribution of the paper. Koning (2009) is an 
exception, but we extend his work in several ways. Most importantly, our 
estimates for the impact of experience rating can be given a causal interpretation. 
The lack of prior evidence is partly due to the fact that disability benefit 
expenditures are subject to experience rating only in a few countries. Still, the 
topic should be of considerable interest as many countries suffer from high and 
still growing rates of disability programme participation, and experience rating is 
one potentially effective policy instrument. 
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3. Institutional framework for Finland 
The Finnish social security system has been subject to continuous changes over 
time. Below we describe the features of the system that were in force from the 
early 1990s until 2004, which is the time period covered by our empirical 
analysis. 
3.1 Sickness and disability benefits 
An employee who is unable to perform his job due to illness or injury is entitled 
to compensation for income losses. The applicant needs a statement by a doctor 
or hospital certifying that he is not capable of work. For the first ten working 
days the applicant is fully compensated by the employer, after which he can 
claim a sickness benefit from the Social Insurance Institution (KELA). 
Depending on the collective labour agreement, many employers continue to pay 
wages or salary after the mandatory waiting period of ten working days, in which 
case the allowance is paid to the employer. As a result, the time out of work until 
receipt of a sickness benefit directly from the Social Insurance Institution is 
typically one to three months. The sickness benefit is determined by the past 
taxable earnings, and it can be received for a maximum of about one year (300 
working days, Saturdays included). Depending on illness or disability, the 
applicant's rehabilitation needs and possibilities are assessed in a more extensive 
medical examination during the sickness benefit period. In case of a prolonged 
illness or permanent disability, the employee can apply for a disability pension. 
An ordinary disability (OD) pension is payable to individuals aged 16 to 64 
whose working capacity has significantly decreased. A full benefit is conditional 
on the working capacity loss of at least 60% and a partial benefit for a loss of 40 
to 59%. When determining eligibility, an individual's capability to support 
herself by regular work, age, education, occupation, and place of residence are 
taken into account along with the medical assessment. The OD pension can be 
granted either indefinitely (if return to work is not likely) or for a specific period. 
In the latter case, the OD pension is also referred to as a rehabilitation subsidy or 
a cash rehabilitation benefit, and its receipt is conditional on a rehabilitation plan. 
An OD pension may be discontinued if the working capacity of the recipient 
improves, but this rarely happens among older recipients (e.g. OECD, 2008, p. 
116). There is no automatic retesting of the disability status except for new 
periods of the rehabilitation subsidy. 
An individual early retirement (IER) pension is another disability pension which 
is available for employees who have a long working career and who are unable to 
continue in their current job because of deteriorated health. Compared with the 
OD pension, eligibility for the IER pension is subject to less strict medical 
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criteria. The minimum degree of working incapacity is not defined and 
occupational factors like the length of service and working conditions carry 
greater weight. It suffices that working capacity has reduced to such an extent 
that the person cannot continue in her present job or occupation, so that other 
working possibilities are not considered. Unlike the OD pension however, the 
IER pension is payable only to employees above a certain age threshold. In the 
private sector, there was a uniform age threshold of 55 until 1994 when it was 
raised by three years to 58 for people born in 1940 or later. In 2000 the age 
threshold was raised further by two years to 60 for those born in 1944 or later. In 
2004 the IER scheme was abolished entirely from these same cohorts. At the 
same time the medical criteria for OD pension eligibility were somewhat relaxed 
for people aged 60 and over. 
Saurama (2004) provides some survey evidence that bad health is not the only 
reason for entering into a disability pension in Finland.4 As expected, disability 
pensioners reported bad health as one of the main reasons for retirement, but 
many of them said that straining work played an important role as well. In 
particular, 62% of OD pensioners and 74% of IER pensioners had felt that their 
job had become too exhausting or they could not handle their job any more. A 
notable fraction of the respondents had also felt pressure to retire from the 
management or colleagues: 14% of OD pensioners and 24% of IER pensioners 
were partly forced out of their job. Hence, difficulties in performing job tasks and 
the pressure from the workplace are important factors affecting disability pension 
entry. 
The purpose of the gradual abolition of the IER pension was to reduce the 
disability enrolment rates at higher ages. This reform made the medical 
requirements for disability pension eligibility tougher for the later cohorts who 
have been able to apply only for the OD pension, and thereby should reduce the 
flow into disability pension benefits among those who are not truly disabled. 
Because only those employees born after 1939 (1994 reform) or after 1943 (2000 
reform) were affected, these reforms provide us with a quasi-experimental setting 
for studying the importance of the stringency of medical screening. 
3.2 Experience rating of disability pension benefits 
A particular feature of the Finnish disability scheme is that employers are par-
tially liable for the disability pension costs of their former employees via experi-
ence-rated employer contributions. Experience rating is not applied to firms with 
fewer than 50 (300 until 1995) employees, which pay a fixed tariff rate for each 
                                              
4 The target population of the survey was all people who received early retirement benefits at the end of 
1998. The early retirees were asked for their reasons of retiring. The response rate was quite low – only 
51.3% – and young disability pensioners were under-represented. The numbers referred to in the text 
were taken from table 12 in Saurama (2004, p. 132). 
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employee. The larger firms are partially covered by experience-rated contribu-
tions and partially by fixed (age-dependent) tariff rates. The employer subject to 
experience rating must pay its share of the present value of disability pension 
costs at the time when a disability pension is awarded to its former employee. 
Given that disability pension costs can accumulate over several years until the 
person reaches age 65 and transfers to an old-age pension, the disability event 
can become very costly for the former employer in the case of a large firm. 
To be more specific, consider an employee i of firm j who is awarded a disability 
pension in year t. As a consequence, his employer has to make a lump-sum con-
tribution equal to  
  ,)( ,1,, ititjij bagesizeC         (1) 
where bi is an annual disability pension benefit, g is the present-value multiplier 
and a is the degree of experience rating applied to firm j. The product of pension 
benefit bi and multiplier g serves as an estimate of the present value of expected 
disability pension benefits up to the age when the entitlement to an old-age pen-
sion begins.5 The multiplier g is a decreasing function of worker's age at the time 
of disability retirement, ranging from 9.66 at age 50 to 2.31 at age 62 for the 
groups analysed in this study. 
The realized marginal cost of a disability retirement entry depends crucially on 
the degree of experience rating, a which is determined by the size of the firm's 
workforce in year t – 1. Until 1995, a was 0 for all firms with fewer than 300 
employees. In these firms the pension contributions were independent of the re-
tirement events of their employees and, consequently, the marginal cost of dis-
ability retirement was 0. For the larger firms, a increased as a linear function of 
firm size from zero (300 employees) to one (1000 employees); see figure 1. That 
is, the largest firms with at least 1000 employees were fully liable for the ex-
pected disability pension costs of their former employees. 
                                              
5 We obtained the values of γ from a pension institution. All the pension institutions use the same values. 
The multiplier is determined by the average duration of disability pension receipt of persons who are 
granted a disability pension at a given age. It also accounts for the (average) probability that the person 
returns to work and the (average) survival probability until age 65. 
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Figure 1. The degree of experience rating (a) as a function of firm size in 
different periods 
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During the time period under investigation, the experience rating scheme 
changed twice. In 1996 the experience rating scheme was first extended to cover 
also firms with 50 to 299 employees. A smaller reform took place in 2000 when 
the maximum liability share was limited to 0.8. As a result of the two reforms, 
the degree of experience rating varies across firms of a given size over time, 
which can be seen in figure 1. By exploiting this variation for identification, we 
can distinguish the effect of experience rating from the firm size effect. 
To highlight the size of disability costs for the employer, consider a worker who 
is awarded a disability pension at age 55 g  7.22. Assuming the pension benefit 
equals 55% of the past annual salary, which is true on average, the maximum 
disability cost for the former employer would be as much as four times the an-
nual salary (i.e. a = 1 for a firm with over 1000 employees before 2000). In the 
case of a firm with 400 employees, the disability cost would correspond either to 
7 months' salary (pre-1996 rules) or 18 months' salary (rules from 1996 on-
wards). Hence, it is evident that the disability costs for the former employers can 
be quite large, and that these costs changed substantially due to the two reforms.6 
                                              
6 It is worth noting that the Finnish experience rating system differs from the Dutch one studied by 
Koning (2009) at least in the following ways: 1) the employer's liability is not limited to the first five 
years of disability benefit costs, 2) the disability event causes a lump-sum payment, having no effect on 
the pension contributions thereafter, and 3) the degree of experience rating varies much more across firms 
of different size. 
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The aim of experience rating is to minimize the employer's moral hazard problem 
by placing costs on those firms whose employees enter the disability pension 
schemes. When an employee applies for a disability pension, the employer has 
no direct control over the decision made by the pension institution. Nevertheless, 
the employer has the means to indirectly affect the flow into sick leave and the 
likelihood that recipients of sickness benefits will return to work rather than re-
tire via a disability pension scheme. If effective, experience rating should induce 
the employer to take preventive measures to minimize the flow into sick leave 
(the ex ante effect), as well as to put effort into getting its employees back to 
work from sick leave (the ex post effect). The preventive action may involve real-
location of the workload to minimize stress-related illness and arrangements that 
reduce accidents at the workplace. When helping people come back to work from 
sick leave, occupational rehabilitation and job modifications that allow the 
switching of jobs within the firm are crucial for those who cannot perform their 
old tasks despite medical rehabilitation. 
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4. Data and descriptive evidence 
4.1 Data 
Our data set was drawn from the records of the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-
Employee Database (FLEED). Employee information in the database is obtained 
by merging information from over 20 administrative registers with unique 
personal identity numbers. The database covers effectively everyone with a 
permanent residence in Finland. Along with standard socio-demographic 
background variables, the database includes detailed information on annual 
income (from the tax authorities), job spells (from the pension institutes), 
unemployment spells and participation in labour market programmes (from the 
employment offices). For people who are employed in the last week of a given 
year, the ES database also includes the unique identification code of the firm and 
establishment. This allows us to identify individuals who are working for the 
same employer and provides a link to firm records. Thus we are able to measure 
labour turnover and employment changes at establishment and firm levels. 
The principal source of firm records in the FLEED is the Financial Statements 
Statistics (FSS), which is an annual survey conducted by Statistics Finland. The 
survey contains corporate income statement and balance sheet data on firms in 
manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, business services, hotel 
and restaurant services, and transportation. This data is available with time 
consistent variable definitions for the period 1986−2005. All firms above a 
certain size threshold, which varies between the sectors and over time, have been 
included in the survey. Until 1996 also a sample of smaller firms was included in 
the survey, but since then Statistics Finland has collected information on the 
small firms only from the administrative registers. So, the survey data for the 
later years have been complemented by adding firm records from the Business 
Tax Register with more limited information content but covering all firms in the 
private sector. The combined survey-register data should be dynamically 
representative over all firms in each year, although some small firms are missing 
from the first six years of our observation period. 
Some key variables in the employee data contain information on sickness 
benefits, paid by KELA during the year, and on the types of pension benefits 
received at the last week of the year. These are used to detect transitions into sick 
leave and disability retirement. As discussed above, employees on sick leave are 
fully compensated by their employers for the first ten days to three months, 
depending on the collective labour agreement under which they are employed. 
Hence, receipt of sickness benefits directly from KELA indicates a prolonged 
illness. 
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We can distinguish between OD and IER pension benefits, but we do not know 
the compensation level (partial or full benefit), nor whether a disability pension 
was granted indefinitely or for a specific period. We classify an employee as 
being on a disability pension if he or she received either OD or IER pension 
benefits at the last week of the year. 
4.2 Incidence of disability retirement 
We begin by considering the extent of the disability problem in Finland. While 
the official retirement age was 65 until 2005,7 the effective retirement age – the 
average age of new pensioners – has been around 60 due to early retirement 
schemes, of which the disability schemes are the most important ones. In 2007 a 
roughly equal number of new pensioners were granted a disability pension and 
an old-age pension, but a few years earlier the disability pension was the most 
common pathway to retirement. This explains why disability expenditures are so 
high in Finland compared with other industrialized countries. 
Figure 2. Population share of disability pensioners by birth year 
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A high incidence of disability is illustrated in figure 2 where the disability 
enrolment rates (including both OD and IER pension recipients) are shown as a 
                                              
7 The ordinary old-age pension was available for people older than 61 but only those entering at age 65 
received the full benefits. Since 2005, employees have been able to choose freely at which age between 
63 and 68 they begin to collect the old-age pension benefits. 
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function of age for four birth cohorts by sex.8 Within all birth cohorts, women 
have lower enrolment rates at each age. 
Compared with the later cohorts, employees born in 1940 are more likely to be 
disabled at all ages. Close to 30% of this cohort were on a disability pension at 
age 60, which is a strikingly large figure. There are no notable differences in 
disability rates at a given age between the 1945, 1950 and 1955 cohorts. The 
lower disability rates for these cohorts may to some extent be related to their 
ineligibility for the IER pension scheme. 
4.3 Outcome variables for analysis of transitions 
We distinguish the likelihood of entering sick leave, which often means only 
temporary absence from work, from the likelihood of being granted a disability 
pension, which almost surely means a permanent withdrawal from the labour 
market. The determinants of these events can differ and be affected by experi-
ence rating in different ways. Hence, we shall model transitions from work to a 
disability pension, from work to sick leave, and from sick leave to a disability 
pension. This approach ignores possible spill over effects toward other exit desti-
nations, most notably into unemployment, which should be kept in mind when 
interpreting our results. 
In all of our models the risk set in year t includes employees who (i) were 50 to 
62 years old at the end of year t – 1, (ii) held a job at the end of year t – 1 in a 
private-sector firm with at least ten employees, (iii) had been working, without 
receiving any pension benefits, at least for three consecutive years (i.e. from the 
beginning of year t – 3 until the end of year t – 1),9 and (iv) did not receive sick-
ness benefits during year t – 1.10 We exclude the younger and older employees 
because their transitions into disability retirement are very rare. Moreover, for 
younger employees it is probably very difficult to be granted a disability pension 
without serious injury or illness, whereas the older employees can retire via other 
early retirement schemes, suggesting that the misuse of the disability pension 
schemes is not a serious issue for these groups. We also exclude employees from 
firms with less than ten employees, as the data on very small firms is noisy. 
                                              
8 Statistics Finland changed its procedure of merging register data on pension benefits in 1995. This led to 
an unexplained (small) drop in the number of disability pension recipients in the FLEED for that year, 
reflecting some technical problems. For that reason we chose to break the time series in 1995. 
9 The cost of a disability pension is borne by the former employer (according to the experience-rating 
rules concerning firm size) only when the employment relationship has lasted for a minimum of three 
years. We also include workers who changed their jobs within the 3-year period but control for job tenure 
in the probability models. Excluding these workers from the analysis does not notably affect our results. 
10 The cost of disability pension is borne by the former employer (according to the experience-rating rules 
concerning firm size) only when the employment relationship has lasted for a minimum of three years. 
We also include workers who changed their jobs within 3-year period but control for job tenure in the 
probability models. Excluding these workers from the analysis does not notably affect our results. 
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Transitions to disability pension. Because receipt of a disability pension typi-
cally follows a sick leave and/or rehabilitation measures, there is a gap between 
the job withdrawal, which is of our primary interest, and actual entry into disabil-
ity pension benefits. To detect the year when the process towards disability re-
tirement started, we follow each person at risk in year t for the next three years 
(two years from 2002). The employee is classified as becoming disabled in year t 
if her working career was interrupted during that year and she was granted a dis-
ability pension by the end of year t + 2, without being unemployed or employed 
in the another firm in meantime.11 That is, we are interested in transitions from a 
given workplace to disability retirement, but allow for periods of sick leave and 
rehabilitation between these two events. The majority of disability pensions fol-
lowing job withdrawal in year t are granted during year t (46%) or t + 1 (48%), 
while the number of entries into disability retirement drops sharply in year t + 2. 
A few pensions are also granted at the later periods but we think that assigning 
them to the employer at the end of year t – 1 is too unreliable and hence we dis-
card those cases. 
Transitions to sick leave. Receipt of an OD pension typically follows a one-year 
period on sickness benefits, and therefore almost all OD pensioners have been on 
sick leave before retiring. However, some employees have retired directly via the 
IER scheme without being on sickness benefits first. Since deteriorated health is 
a prerequisite for receipt of an IER pension as well (and since short spells of 
sickness benefits are not observed in the data), also these employees are classi-
fied as entering sick leave in the year when the pension was granted. Thus, an 
employee at risk in year t moves into sick leave during that year if he started to 
collect sickness benefits or was granted a disability pension during year t even 
without actually receiving sickness benefits. About a quarter of workers who 
were awarded a disability pension did not receive sickness benefits. However, 
apart from the effect of IER pension eligibility, our estimates appear to be fairly 
robust with respect to the treatment of this group. 
Transitions from sick leave to disability pension. When modelling the likeli-
hood of being granted a disability pension conditional on being on sickness bene-
fits, the risk set in year t includes only those employees who started to collect 
sickness benefits during year t, including also those who were granted a disability 
pension without a period of sick leave. 
Illustration. Four possible labour histories are shown in figure 3. Each of these 
persons is at risk of making a transition to disability retirement and to sick leave 
in year t. Employees A, B and C withdrew from work in year t and were granted 
                                              
11 Receipt of a disability pension is not observed for some people in 1995 due to the change in the proce-
dure of merging the underlying register data. Using the 3-year moving window for transitions to disability 
pension also minimizes this problem. 
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a disability pension by the end of year t + 2. According to our definition, they 
made a transition from work to disability retirement in year t  (Dt = 1). Since em-
ployees A and D received sickness benefits and employee C started to collect 
disability pension benefits in year t, they are also classified as entering sick leave 
in that year (St = 1). When modelling transitions from sick leave to disability re-
tirement, employees A, C and D would be included in the risk set in year t, but 
not employee B who was out of work for an unknown reason. 
Figure 3. Examples of labour market histories for persons at risk in year t. 
t - 4 t -  3  t  -  2  t - 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3  t  +  4  
B: D = 1, S = 0 
C: D = 1, S = 1 
D: D = 0, S = 1 
Employed Sickness Disability Other / irrelevant 
A: D = 1, S = 1 
 
4.4 Sample design for modelling transition rates 
The transition probabilities (or rates) defined above are closely interrelated but 
not perfectly. Namely, it holds that 
Pr( 1) Pr( 1) Pr( 1| 1), 1991,1992,...2002,t t t tD S D S t       
where Pr(Dt = 1) denotes the likelihood of starting disability retirement (by the 
end of year t + 2) due to job withdrawal in year t, Pr(St = 1) is the likelihood of 
entering sick leave in year t and Pr(Dt = 1|St = 1) is the likelihood that a sick 
leave starting in year t eventually lead to disability retirement. It should be 
stressed that employees whose working career was interrupted without receipt of 
sickness benefits in year t and who were granted a disability pension in year t + 1 
or t + 2 contribute to the event on the left-hand side of the equation but not to the 
events on the right-hand side (e.g. person B in figure 3). As a result, the product 
of the two probabilities on the right-hand side is typically less than the overall 
disability probability on the left-hand side. Nevertheless, the product of Pr(St = 1) 
and Pr(Dt = 1|St = 1) gives a useful decomposition for Pr(Dt = 1) although its ap-
proximate nature should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. By com-
paring the determinants of Pr(St = 1) and Pr(Dt = 1|St = 1), we aim at making a 
distinction between the ex ante and ex post effects of the covariates of interest. 
Our estimation samples include all employees who are at risk of making a transi-
tion of interest between the years 1991 and 2002. The sample period ends in 
2002, because when detecting the timing of job withdrawals, we have to be able 
to follow employees at risk at least for the next two or three years. The first pe-
 17 
 
riod is 1991 because the FLEED employee data are available from 1988 onwards 
and we need employee records from the past three years to construct the worker 
flow variables. Our samples are rotating panels where in each year new employ-
ees enter the risk set while some old ones leave it. 
4.5 Raw transition rates 
Table 1 reports the sizes of the risk groups and the raw transition rates by age. 
All transition rates increase almost uniformly with age. The likelihood of a 
transition to sick leave becomes five times larger while the likelihood of being 
granted a disability pension grows eightfold from age 50 to 62. This is explained 
by the fact that employees are less likely to return to work from sick leave at 
older ages, as seen in the last column. The transition rate from sick leave to 
disability retirement is strikingly high at all ages; one-half of sickness benefit 
recipients aged 50, and four in five above age 58, do not return to work but end 
up in disability retirement. 
Table 1. Transition rates and the size of risk groups by age 
 
 
 
 
Notes: N is the size of the risk group for transitions to disability retirement and sick leave. R is the size of 
the risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. Pr(S = 1) is the probability of a tran-
sition to sick leave. Pr(D = 1|S = 1) is the probability of a transition to disability retirement conditional on 
being on sick leave. 
 
It is noteworthy that the size of the group at risk of entering sick leave or becom-
ing disabled declines rapidly with age. While the total number of employees at 
risk is about 127,000 at age 50, the group at risk halves by age 56 and includes 
only 11,000 employees at age 62. This declining age pattern reflects the fact that 
people tend to withdraw from employment quite early. In particular, it is rather 
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common for private-sector employees to end up in long-term unemployment at 
older ages because employees above a certain age threshold at the time of unem-
ployment entry can collect earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits 
until retirement at age 60 via the unemployment pension scheme (see e.g. Kyyrä 
and Wilke, 2007). 
Because of the experience rating system, variation in the transition rates across 
firms of different sizes is of particular interest. In table 2, employees are classi-
fied into four groups according to the size of their employer at the end of year t –
 1. As seen in the last column, there are no systematic differences in the transition 
rates to sick leave or disability retirement in firms with 1000 or fewer employees. 
However, in the largest firms the transition rate to both sick leave and disability 
retirement is notably higher than in the smaller firms. The experience rating of 
disability pension expenditures, which devotes higher cost shares for larger 
firms, would have implied the opposite. Moreover, the transition rate from sick 
leave to disability retirement does not vary with firm size, giving no support for 
the ex post effect of experience rating. 
There are reasons why disability and sick leave entries may be associated with 
current or past employment changes at the workplace. The past employment re-
ductions can lead to added stress at the workplace such as reduced control over 
one's chores and increased workload and job insecurity. This could cause health 
problems for those who kept their jobs (e.g. Vahtera et al., 2005). Encouraging 
disability retirement of older employees can be a helpful strategy in downsizing 
and restructuring endeavours of a firm, suggesting that there might be a relation-
ship between the current growth rate and disability incidence.12 Since the diffi-
culties of laying off older employees probably vary with business conditions, the 
disability entry rates can also vary between downsizing and expansion periods. 
                                              
12 A recent study by Gielen and Van Ours (2006) analyses age differences in job reallocation and labour 
mobility using matched worker-firm data for the Netherlands. They find that firms adjust their workforce 
mainly via entry for young and prime-age workers, but via separations for older workers. Furthermore, 
employment of old workers is found to be more responsive to firm-specific employment changes. 
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Table 2. Transition rates by firm size and establishment growth 
 
Notes: Establishments were divided into contracting, stable and growing ones according to 3-year growth 
rates from t – 4 to t – 1 and from t – 1 to t + 2. In contracting establishments the growth rate was below 
–0.1, in stable ones between [–0.1, 0.15) and in growing ones greater or equal to 0.15. 
 
To address these questions we examine the relationship between the transition 
probabilities and the past and current growth rates of employment. The growth 
rates are measured over three-year periods to smooth out annual noise in 
employment variation, and because retirement decisions are hardly based on 
yearly variation. Following the job and worker flow literature, we define the 
growth rate as , , ,t s t se e  where ste ,  is the employment change from year t to 
year s in a given establishment, and ,t se  is the average employment level in years 
t and s. The growth rates defined in this way can take values on the interval 
[−2, 2]. Employment is measured by the number of employees in the 
establishment at the end of the year. Since employees at risk in year t were by 
construction all still employed at the end of year t – 1, the past growth rate is 
computed over the period from year t – 4 to year t – 1. With the current growth 
rate we refer to the employment change from year t – 1 to year t + 2, as the 
possible transition to disability retirement must take place by the end of year 
t + 2. 
We believe that labour demand conditions are best described by employment 
changes in the establishment for those who are employed in large firms with 
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multiple establishments. So we consider employment variation at establishment 
level, even though we control the size of the personnel at firm level. In table 2, 
employees are further divided into groups according to the past and current 
growth rate of the establishment at which they worked at the end of year t – 1 
Establishments whose growth rate lies on the interval [−0.10, 0.15) are labelled 
to be ‘stable’ as opposed to contracting and expanding ones. The average growth 
during the period under investigation was slightly below 0.05, so that the 
contracting and expanding establishments are defined in comparison to the 
growth trend. 
First of all, note that our finding that the transition rates to sick leave and 
disability retirement are highest for the employees of firms with over 1000 
employees holds also when we are conditioning on the past or current 
employment growth category. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the transition rates 
does seem to be sensitive with respect to the past or current growth rates. 
Differences in the transition rates between employees at contracting, expanding 
and stable establishments are generally very small, and do not exhibit consistent 
patterns. These results should not be taken as conclusive, however, since it is 
possible that compositional differences in the older workforce across firms of 
different size, and establishments in different growth categories mask the 
underlying true relationships. 
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5. Determinants of transition rates 
We apply pooled-data logit models to study the determinants of the transition 
rates. The results from our baseline specification for individual-specific and em-
ployer-specific covariates are shown in tables 3 and 4, respectively. We report 
the odds ratios for dummy variables and the marginal effects for all covariates 
along with standard errors that are robust to clustering to account for correlation 
across individuals working in the same establishment. The marginal effects are 
computed for an average person of the risk group.13 We begin our discussion 
with the impact of individual background characteristics. Then we proceed to the 
parameters of primary interest, describing the effects of the strictness of medical 
criteria, experience rating and growth rates. 
5.1 Individual characteristics 
As seen in table 3, the transition rate to sick leave and disability retirement 
increases strongly with age. For example, the likelihood of entering sick leave is 
3.6 percentage points higher at age 62 than at age 50. The difference in the 
likelihood of becoming disabled grows faster with age and is almost six 
percentage points higher at 62. These are relatively large increases as the general 
level of the transition rates is rather low. The average probabilities of entries into 
sick leave and disability retirement are around 2.2% and 1.9% per year, 
respectively, as shown in table 3. In terms of the odds ratios, the effect of age on 
the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is largely similar to the 
effect on the transition rate from work to sick leave. 
Women are less likely to move into sick leave and more likely to return to work 
from sick leave, leading to a lower transition rate to disability retirement. This 
finding is in line with women's lower incidence of disability in figure 2. The 
likelihood of being granted a disability pension decreases uniformly with 
education. The odds of becoming a disability pension recipient is 0.45 for an 
employee with a Master's degree or higher compared with an otherwise similar 
employee with a basic education, which corresponds to a 1.2 percentage point 
lower annual risk of becoming disabled. Education has no effect on the 
likelihood of returning to work from sick leave. Hence, the lower risk of 
disability for the educated people is explained by their lower transition rates to 
sick leave. 
                                              
13 The risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement is different from that for other 
transitions, and thereby the marginal effects are evaluated at the different values of the covariates. This 
does not, however, alter our interpretation of covariate effects. 
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Table 3. Odds ratios and marginal effects for individual-specific covari-
ates from baseline logit models 
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(continues) 
 
Notes: The models also include controls for year, industry and living region. The reference employee is a 
50-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother 
tongue, and worked at the end of year t – 1 in an establishment with 10 to 50 employees. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in bold (95% con-
fidence level) or in italics (90% confidence level).  
a) Dummy for those who may be granted an IER pension by the end of year t.  
b) The share of sickness benefits of taxable labour income.  
c) Employee’s position in the establishment’s wage distribution, ranging from 0 for the lowest wage to 1 
for the highest wage. 
 
Employees holding better jobs at the workplace, as measured by their position in 
the wage distribution, have a lower risk of disability retirement because they are 
less likely to end up on sick leave and more likely to return to work from sick 
leave. Family background also matters. Compared with singles, employees 
whose spouse is still working have a slightly lower probability of sick leave but a 
higher probability of moving from sick leave to a disability pension. It appears 
that employees with a retired spouse are the most likely to enter sick leave and 
the least likely to return to work from sick leave. This may indicate that 
employees with a retired spouse value their leisure time more than the other 
groups. Alternatively, their spouses may require special attention at home if they 
suffer from health problems. 
Unfortunately, our data do not contain direct measures of health. To approximate 
health history we exploit information on the amount of sickness benefits 
collected in the past years. By construction, the employee at risk in year t did not 
receive sickness benefits in year t – 1. For year t – 2 we add a dummy variable 
indicating whether the employee received sickness benefits, as well as the share 
of sickness benefits of taxable labour income as a proxy for the fraction of the 
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time spent on sick leave during that year.14 For the next two years, we also add 
dummy variables indicating receipt of sickness benefits. Not surprisingly, receipt 
of sickness benefits in the past increases the transition rates to sick leave and to 
disability retirement. Having been on sick leave in year t – 2 raises the likelihood 
of becoming disabled at least by 2.1 percentage points, the overall effect 
depending on the time spent on sickness benefits. Conditional on being on sick 
leave, past sickness history has no effect on the likelihood of being granted a 
disability pension. 
5.2 Strictness of medical criteria 
In 1994 the age threshold for the IER retirement scheme was increased from 55 
to 58 for workers born in 1940 or later. In 2000 the entire scheme was effectively 
abolished from all private-sector employees born in 1944 or later. Given a 
relatively low emphasis on medical factors when determining eligibility for IER 
pensions, these reforms can be viewed as increases in the stringency of medical 
screening for the disability status. It is worth emphasizing that the oldest affected 
employees were below the pre-reform age thresholds at the time of the reforms. 
This rules out anticipation behaviour towards IER pensions, providing us with a 
quasi-experimental setting for evaluating the impact of the medical criteria. More 
specifically, we exploit the changes in the criteria by including a time-varying 
dummy variable that equals one for employees born before 1940 who were at 
least 54 years old at the end of year t – 1 and for those born between 1940 and 
1943 who were at least 57 years old at the end of year t – 1 (Relaxed medical 
criteria in table 3). These groups of employees can potentially qualify for IER 
pension benefits by the end of year t, so that their disability pension applications 
are subject to the less strict medical assessment compared with all other 
employees. 
Being eligible to apply for an IER pension clearly raises all three transition rates. 
The odds of entering sick leave is 1.6, implying a 1.2 percentage point higher 
transition rate to sick leave for an employee who can apply for an IER pension 
benefit than for an otherwise similar non-eligible employee. Conditional on being 
on sickness benefits, the IER pension scheme increases the likelihood of being 
granted a disability pension by 9.8 percentage points. The overall probability of 
moving to the disability pension track is one percentage point higher for 
employees with an option to apply for an IER pension. Not surprisingly, these 
estimates are somewhat sensitive with respect to the treatment of workers who 
moved directly from work to disability retirement without receiving sickness 
benefits first. If these workers are removed from the pool of sickness benefit 
                                              
14 This is not an accurate measure because the waiting time until the receipt of sickness benefits from 
KELA can vary between employees, and because the amount of a sickness benefit is determined as a 
decreasing fraction of the past earnings. 
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recipients, the impact of IER scheme eligibility becomes weaker: its effect on the 
odds of entering sick leave drops to 1.3 (and the associated marginal effect to 
0.0046) and that on the odds of moving from a sick leave to disability retirement 
reduces to 1.2 (and the marginal effect to 0.0327). Nevertheless, all the effects 
remain statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels, implying 
that our qualitative results are robust. Overall, our findings are in accordance 
with Börsch-Supan's (2007) conclusion that the strictness by which vocational 
considerations (at the expense of medical criteria) are applied when determining 
eligibility for disability pension benefits is strongly related to disability pension 
incidence. 
5.3 Experience rating 
Next we turn to the effects of the covariates that are closely related to the 
experience-rated contributions: firm size, disability cost and equity ratio. The 
first determines the degree of experience rating but could have an effect on its 
own. The second measures the expected lump-sump payment the employer has to 
pay in the case the employee is granted a disability pension in year t. This 
marginal cost of the disability event is a function of the worker's age, disability 
pension benefit (determined by earnings history) and the degree of experience 
rating applied to the employer (determined by firm size in a given year).15 As we 
control for age, earnings, firm size and year fixed effects in the model, the effect 
of disability cost is identified by the two reforms in the experience rating scheme 
that were described in section 3.2. The third variable, the equity ratio, measures 
the firm's ability to incur disability pension costs. 
The model includes three dummy variables for the size of the employing firm at 
the end of year t – 1. The smallest firms with 10 to 50 employees, which were not 
subject to the experience-rated contributions in any year, serve as the reference 
category. This size categorization is relatively coarse, but our results are not 
sensitive with respect to different specifications of the firm size effects. As seen 
in table 4, the likelihood of a transition from work to sick leave increases with 
firm size, being significantly higher for the largest firms. Namely, an employee 
of a firm with over 1000 employees has a 0.9 percentage point higher risk of 
entering sick leave per year than an otherwise similar person in a firm with 50 or 
fewer employees. In the large firms many people are doing similar work, making 
it easier to share job tasks of a sick person between the remaining employees. 
This may induce the employees of large firms to apply for sickness benefits more 
                                              
15 The disability costs are estimated using the formula in equation (1). Since the true level of the disability 
pension benefit is not known, we assume the pension benefit would be a fixed percent (55%) of the an-
nual earnings. 
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frequently, which could explain our finding. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
disability retirement conditional on being a recipient of sickness benefits is 
almost independent of the firm size. As a consequence, there is a positive 
relationship between the firm size and the overall risk of ending up with a 
disability pension. Note that these estimates should describe the true firm size 
effects, as the disability cost variable accounts for the effect of the degree of 
experience rating.16 
Table 4. Odds ratios and marginal effects for employer-specific covariates 
from baseline logit models 
 
 
Notes: The models also include controls for year, industry and living region. The reference employee is a 
50-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother 
tongue, and worked at the end of year t – 1 in an establishment with 10 to 50 employees. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in bold (95% con-
fidence level) or in italics (90% confidence level).  
a) Equity as share of assets (bottom coded below the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th percentile) 
 
                                              
16 Should we exclude the disability cost from the model, there would be a large effect of firm size on the 
transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement. For the employees of the two largest employer 
groups, the odds of moving from sick leave to disability retirement would be about 0.66, corresponding to 
a decrease of 9 percentage points in the disability probability for the average recipient of sickness bene-
fits. 
 27 
 
The expected cost of disability retirement has a negative effect on all the 
transition rates (see table 4). These effects are accurately estimated, but the 
magnitude of the marginal effects is very small. For a recipient of sickness 
benefits a ten percentage point increase in the disability cost decreases the 
likelihood of being awarded a disability pension by 0.1 percentage points. The 
other two marginal effects are even smaller. However, one should note that the 
disability cost variable exhibits a large degree of variation, ranging from zero to 
several times the annual earnings. To get a better picture of the effects of 
experience rating, we computed the transition probabilities at different ages and 
different values of the disability cost variable, holding all the other covariates 
fixed at their sample means. In the absence of the disability cost due to 
experience rating, the likelihood of being granted a disability pension at age 55 
would be 0.024. When the disability cost are introduced and set to the median 
value of disability costs in the sample, this probability declines to 0.017, i.e. a 
decrease of about 30%. Furthermore, by introducing the maximum degree of 
experience rating, it is possible to obtain some 50% decline in the disability risk 
at age 50 compared with the case of no experience rating. A somewhat larger part 
of these experience rating effects can be attributed to the decline in the transition 
rate to sick leave, but the increase in the likelihood of returning to employment 
from sick leave plays a notable role as well. In other words, both the ex ante and 
ex post effects of experience rating are not only statistically significant, but also 
economically important.17 
Since experience rating aims to affect employer behaviour through financial 
incentives, the effectiveness of such incentives should depend on the firm's 
financial position. When the experience-rated firm is short of liquid assets, it 
might try harder to deter exits to disability retirement to avoid the costs that in a 
dire financial situation might bankrupt the firm. This is a relevant concern 
especially in the Finnish system where the employer has to pay its share of the 
present value of disability costs as a lump-sum payment at the time when a 
disability pension is granted to its employee. To address this question we use the 
equity ratio as a proxy for the firm's financial position.18 In table 4, the equity 
ratio has a positive effect on the likelihood of being granted a disability pension. 
It also has a strong effect on the likelihood that a sick leave will be followed by a 
disability pension. This implies that a recipient of sickness benefits in a firm in a 
weak financial position returns to work with a relatively high probability. 
                                              
17 It is not clear at which point the employers became aware of the new experience rating scheme before 
the law changes. The reforms may also have induced some sort of anticipationary behaviour just before 
the new rules came into effect. However, if we drop one or two years preceding the reforms from the 
analysis, our results do not change notably. 
18 There are a few extreme values for the equity ratio. To deal with such outliers we bottom and top coded 
the equity ratio at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. That is, we use the threshold values for ob-
servations below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile. 
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Table 5. Marginal effects for the equity ratio by firm size from extended 
logit models 
 
 
Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly non-
zero marginal effects in bold (95% confidence level) or in italics (90% confidence level).  
a) Equity as share of assets (bottom coded below the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th percentile). 
 
Given that the experience-rated contributions depend on firm size and that larger 
firms may have better possibilities to organize retraining and arrange alternative 
job tasks for their employees with reduced working capacity, we should expect 
the effect of the equity ratio to vary across firms of different size. We therefore 
extend our baseline specification by adding interaction terms of firm size 
categories and equity ratio. The results of this exercise are shown in table 5. 
There is no evidence of statistically significant effects in the smallest firms that 
are not subject to experience rating, which is consistent with the claim that the 
effect of the equity ratio is attributable to the experience rating system. In firms 
that employ more than 300 employees, the likelihood of being granted a 
disability pension increases with the equity ratio. In the case of the largest firms, 
the likelihood of being granted a disability pension for a recipient of sickness 
benefits increases with the equity ratio: an increase of ten percentage points in 
the equity ratio is related to a 1.9 percentage point increase in the disability 
pension incidence. Put differently, large firms that can afford the cost of 
disability pension expenditures seem to put less effort into occupational 
rehabilitation compared with large firms in a weaker economic position. 
In sum, our findings give strong support for the hypothesis that experience rating 
affects employer behaviour. The higher expected cost of the disability event for 
the employer lowers transition rates from work to sick leave and from sick leave 
to disability retirement. This suggests that the firms subject to experience rating 
apply preventive measures to minimize entries to sick leave, as well as put more 
effort in occupational rehabilitation to get their employees on sickness benefits 
back to work. Our results for the effect of the equity ratio give further support for 
the importance of experience rating effects. Namely, the financial position of a 
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firm has an effect on the employees of the larger firms that are liable for a 
significant fraction of disability pension expenditure of their former employees, 
whereas we find no relationship between the equity ratio and transition rates in 
the firms that are not subject to experience rating. 
5.4 Employment growth and excess turnover 
In addition to the growth rates, our models include a control variable for excess 
worker turnover, which measures the degree of restructuring at the workplace for 
a given net change in employment.19 In general, the growth and excess turnover 
rates are affected by the outcome of interest, that is, the worker's transition out of 
work. To eliminate the resulting endogeneity problem, we have adjusted these 
covariates for each worker by removing the effect of the worker's own mobility 
in and out of the establishment. 
Excess worker turnover can be either voluntary or involuntary from the 
employees' standpoint. It may result from the restructuring measures through 
which the employer adjusts the structure of the workforce. Or it may be driven by 
a high level of voluntary quits, perhaps induced by poor working conditions, 
management or wage rates, which are compensated by new hires. As seen in 
table 6, excess worker turnover over the past three years has no effect on the 
transition rates. But employees in the establishments with high current levels of 
excess worker turnover are more likely to enter sick leave and less likely to 
return to work from sick leave. Consequently, exits via disability retirement are 
more common in workplaces with a high rate of excess worker turnover. It 
should be noted that the effect of excess worker turnover is conditional on a 
given change in the employment level, as we control for the employment growth 
rates. High turnover can result in extra training work for the tenured employees 
and cause other problems at the workplace, and thereby lead to an increase in 
stress factors. When high turnover reflects an ongoing restructuring process, our 
estimates suggest the possibility that the employer encourages some older 
employees to apply for a disability pension. For an employer that is adjusting the 
structure of the workforce but is not downsizing, such a policy can be an 
effective alternative for dismissals that would be difficult to justify. If so, we 
                                              
19 Excess worker turnover in year t is defined as ht  + st – |Δet |, where ht and st denote the number of hires 
and separations during year t, respectively, and te  is the employment change from the end of year 1t   
to the end of year t in a given establishment. This quantity is the worker flow in excess of what is needed 
to explain the net change in the size of establishment's workforce. Dividing it by the average employment 
level at the end of years t – 1 and t, say ,te  gives the excess turnover rate: ( | |)t t t th s e e   , which 
takes a value on the interval [0, 2]. To smooth annual variation we take the average of the excess turnover 
rates between years t – 4 and t – 1 (for the past period) and between years t – 1 and t + 2 (for the current 
period). 
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should expect to find a positive effect for the employment growth rate as well, 
but none of the effects of the employment changes during the three-year periods 
differs statistically significantly from zero in table 4. 
The underlying assumption of symmetric effects for the expansion and 
contraction of the workforce is quite restrictive. In table 6 we therefore report 
results from model specifications that do not impose such a restriction but allow 
for different coefficients for positive and negative growth rates. It seems that the 
risk of being granted a disability pension is lower for employees holding jobs in 
establishments that are currently either downsizing or expanding. The effects of 
the current growth rates can be attributed to the increased risk of sick leave, 
whereas the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is not affected 
by the current growth rates. 
Table 6. Marginal effects for employment growth rates from extended 
logit models  
 
 
Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly 
(95% confidence level) non-zero marginal effects in bold. 90% confidence level indicated with italics.  
 
The marginal effect of the current decline in employment on the probability of 
disability pension receipt is 0.003. For example, a 50% decrease in the workforce 
over the next three years (i.e. the growth rate of –0.67) is estimated to reduce the 
disability pension entry rate by 0.2 percentage points (= –0.67  0.003  100) 
compared with the case of no change in the size of the workforce. One possible 
explanation is that employees with health problems are less willing to apply for 
sick leave at the times when they are worried about their jobs. During slack 
demand employers may also use dismissals to get rid of employees with reduced 
working capacity before they apply for a sickness benefit or disability pension. In 
any case, the effect of downsizing is very small. It also implies that the 
employers do not encourage early retirement through the disability schemes as a 
soft way of downsizing. 
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The marginal effect of the current employment expansion on the likelihood of 
disability pension receipt is quite large, being –0.0187. Thus, being employed in 
an establishment whose workforce increases by one-half by the end of year t + 2  
(i.e. the growth rate of 0.4) decreases the probability of being granted a disability 
pension by 0.75 percentage points  (= 0.4  –0.0187  100) compared with the 
case of working in a stable establishment. When a firm is expanding its business 
rapidly, it may experience difficulties in hiring the sufficient amount of skilled 
labour. In such a case, the employer may put some extra effort to keep its old 
employees at work, which may explain our finding. Furthermore, for the 
employee an expansion period may indicate better economic opportunities, in 
terms of promotion possibilities or extra pay, which increase the value of staying 
employed despite some health problems. 
Black et al. (2002) found that negative (positive) demand shocks increase 
(decrease) the entry rate to disability benefit schemes in aggregate US data. We 
have just shown that the reverse relationship holds for the negative shocks at the 
establishment level in the Finnish labour market. Of course, one should bear in 
mind that we are considering only transitions out of work. During economic 
downturns, transitions from nonparticipation and unemployment to disability 
schemes are likely to increase, and such transitions may dominate the US data. 
Compared with the impact of the current growth rates, the past growth rates have 
the opposite effects on the likelihood of being granted a disability pension. 
Namely, both the reduction and expansion in the workforce during the past three 
years increase the transition rate to disability retirement. Hence, our findings are 
in accordance with the results of Vahtera et al. (2005) and Rege et al. (2009), 
who found that a large reduction of the workforce in the past leads to a notable 
increase in the entry rate to disability retirement. This is quite remarkable given 
the differences in the research design. Recall that the risk set of Rege et al. 
included also those who lost their job as a result of plant downsizing, whereas 
Vahtera et al. considered only employed workers but their data came from the 
municipal sector and cover an exceptional period of deep recession. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
In this study we analysed how labour demand and institutional factors affect 
transitions to sick leave and disability retirement. Using matched employer-
employee data for the Finnish private sector, we were able to measure the 
employment growth rates and excess worker turnover at the establishment level. 
To study the role of the institutional setting, we exploited the law changes that 
affected the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility and the 
partially experience-rated employer contributions. Our main findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
 For older employees a transition to sick leave is often a one-way street out of 
employment, leading eventually to disability retirement. Some one-half of the 
50−55 year olds and over two-thirds of older workers on sickness benefits 
end up in disability retirement within the next three years. This highlights the 
importance of preventive measures aimed at minimizing the flow into sick 
leave. 
 Those employees who can apply for a disability pension under more lenient 
medical requirements are much more likely to enter sick leave and to retire 
via disability pension benefits. Therefore, the abolition of the individual early 
retirement scheme in 2000 reduced notably the flow into disability retirement 
in the affected groups. 
 There is ample evidence that experience rating lowers the flow into sick leave 
(i.e. the ex ante effect), and reduces transitions from sick leave to disability 
retirement (i.e. the ex post effect). Moreover, the large firms that can easily 
incur their share of early retirement costs due to a strong financial position let 
their employees on sickness benefits exit more easily via disability pension 
schemes than firms in a weaker position do. Financial situation does not 
matter for the smaller firms that are not subject to experience rating. 
 The transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement are relatively large 
in establishments experiencing a high degree of excess worker turnover. 
When the establishment is growing, transitions to sick leave and disability 
retirement become less frequent. There is no evidence that the employers 
would exploit the disability pension scheme as a way of adjusting their 
workforce when downsizing. 
These findings imply two policy recommendations to reduce the disability 
benefit enrolment rate of older workers. First of all, the stringency of medical 
criteria and medical screening for disability benefit eligibility should be tough 
enough. When nonmedical factors are weighted at the expense of medical 
criteria, disability benefits may distort labour supply decisions, inducing also 
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workers who are not truly disabled to retire via disability programmes. This 
appears to be mainly the labour supply issue, as we did not find evidence that 
employers would have encouraged disability retirement when downsizing. 
Secondly, the experience rating of disability benefit costs seems to be an 
effective policy instrument. It seems to induce employers to take preventive 
actions to reduce the inflow into sick leave, as well as to put more effort to get 
their employees on sickness benefits back to work. This finding should be of 
considerable interest, not only for Finland, but also for the other countries that do 
not have an experience rating system for disability benefits (yet). Obviously, 
there are still a number of open questions, regarding, for example, the optimal 
design of experience rating and possible spill over effects on hirings and 
transitions out of work to other destinations than disability retirement. These 
questions need to be addressed in order to get a more complete picture of the 
consequences of the experience rating of disability benefits. 
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